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(See the Editorial Commentary by Szymczak  on pages 21–3.)
Background. Cultural and social determinants influence antibiotic decision-making in hospitals. We investigated and compared 
cultural determinants of antibiotic decision-making in acute medical and surgical specialties.
Methods. An ethnographic observational study of antibiotic decision-making in acute medical and surgical teams at a London 
teaching hospital was conducted (August 2015–May 2017). Data collection included 500 hours of direct observations, and face-to-
face interviews with 23 key informants. A grounded theory approach, aided by Nvivo 11 software, analyzed the emerging themes. An 
iterative and recursive process of analysis ensured saturation of the themes. The multiple modes of enquiry enabled cross-validation 
and triangulation of the findings.
Results. In medicine, accepted norms of the decision-making process are characterized as collectivist (input from pharmacists, 
infectious disease, and medical microbiology teams), rationalized, and policy-informed, with emphasis on de-escalation of therapy. 
The gaps in antibiotic decision-making in acute medicine occur chiefly in the transition between the emergency department and in-
patient teams, where ownership of the antibiotic prescription is lost. In surgery, team priorities are split between 3 settings: operating 
room, outpatient clinic, and ward. Senior surgeons are often absent from the ward, leaving junior staff to make complex medical 
decisions. This results in defensive antibiotic decision-making, leading to prolonged and inappropriate antibiotic use.
Conclusions. In medicine, the legacy of infection diagnosis made in the emergency department determines antibiotic deci-
sion-making. In surgery, antibiotic decision-making is perceived as a nonsurgical intervention that can be delegated to junior staff or other 
specialties. Different, bespoke approaches to optimize antibiotic prescribing are therefore needed to address these specific challenges.
Keywords. antimicrobial decision-making; culture; team dynamics.
Across hospitals, healthcare professionals from a range of spe-
cialties diagnose and treat community- and hospital-acquired 
infections. Antimicrobial stewardship programs (ASPs) are 
implemented in hospitals to optimize antibiotic use [1–3]. These 
programs are not, however, contextually designed or imple-
mented with end users of different specialties in mind. In health-
care, culture influences the shape and outcome of interventions 
and impacts on patient outcomes [4, 5]. Culture has been de-
fined as “the shared knowledge people use to interpret, experi-
ence, and generate behavior” [6] as members of a group. The key 
components of culture are norms, values, tools, and rituals that 
people of a specific group adopt, that identify them as belong-
ing to that group [6, 7]. To optimize patient care, hospital-based 
specialties constantly diversify and evolve in response to scien-
tific and technological breakthroughs and developing technical 
expertise. This diversification creates microcultures within the 
macro healthcare culture [8, 9]. The microcultures within spe-
cialties have the potential to shape intervention outcomes.
ASP studies emphasize quantitative methodologies, to an-
swer “what works,” and “by how much” with an emergent body 
of research investigating “why” interventions do or do not work 
[10]. Studies have explored the contextual determinants of an-
tibiotic prescribing decision-making, identifying the influence 
of hierarchies and etiquette [11], and the complexities of rising 
to expectations set in policies and guidelines [12]. Such insights 
are critical for the development of targeted and sustainable 
ASP. Qualitative research methods provide in-depth under-
standing of the subject being studied leading to development 
of new theories [6, 13]. Ethnographic studies in hospitals pro-
vide a rich understanding of the contextual complexities that 
influence outcomes [14–16]. Qualitative research methods have 
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investigated education and training of doctors [17, 18], and ef-
fective team communication [19, 20] on ward rounds (WRs). 
These studies report on the complexity of WRs. In surgery, 
studies have used WR simulation to test interventions including 
efforts to reduce disruptions, and checklists to improve patient 
outcomes [21–23]. We conducted a mixed-methods study of an-
tibiotic decision-making with a focus on WRs in medicine and 
surgery. The study included ethnographic research into how 
culture and team dynamics within specialties affect antibiotic 
decision-making. We drew on Spradley’s [6] definition of cul-
ture to define and describe the cultural norms and values that 
help generate behaviors (Figure 1). In this article, we describe 
the qualitative findings, focusing on the influence of culture and 
team dynamics on antibiotic decision-making. These insights 
are important in the development of contextually fit ASPs.
METHODS
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the UK National 
Research Ethics Committee (application number 176038).
Sampling and Data Collection
Ward Sample
The study was conducted in a central London teaching hospital 
with 1300 beds and an existing ASP [24]. Wards were conven-
iently sampled to represent a high percentage of elective admis-
sions, and nonelective admissions; wards were identified through 
consultation with medical directors at the hospital. Clinical lead-
ers on the identified medical and surgical wards identified were 
emailed the study information sheet and invited to participate 
in the study. All healthcare professionals who attended the WRs 
or worked on the study wards were eligible to participate in the 
study. The lead consultant surgeons/physicians who agreed to 
participate in the study were asked to provide a list of the names 
of the staff who participated on the WRs. An information leaflet 
was sent to all participants; to reduce bias and Hawthorne effect 
[25], the leaflet stated that the study investigated clinical deci-
sion-making. Informed consent was obtained before the obser-
vations and interviews. The interviews took place following the 
observations to ensure that participants could be questioned 
about their antibiotic decision-making without affecting their 
behaviors during the observations.
Data Collection Methods
Ethnographic Observations
Ethnography is the study of people within the context in which 
they exist, live, and work [6, 13]. The ethnographic study design 
included nonparticipant direct observations, interviews, and 
documentary analysis (detailed notes on the type of data col-
lected are provided as Supplementary Data). One researcher, 
E. C., conducted the observations on the wards and face-to-face 
interviews with key informants. Detailed, descriptive notes of 
observations were collected. Separate reflective notes were kept 
detailing the observer’s perceptions and interpretations of what 
was recorded. Handover sheets, multidisciplinary team meeting 
notes, and the policy and guidelines on antibiotic prescribing 
were collected to provide contextual knowledge of the pro-
cesses. These different methods supported cross-validation and 
triangulation of the findings.
Face-to-Face Interviews
Healthcare professionals participating in the observations were 
invited to participate in a follow up face-to-face interview. 
The interviews were semistructured with an interview guide, 
Figure 1. The model of culture used in this study to study antibiotic decision-making [6]. Abbreviation: ASP, antibiotic stewardship program.
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developed through review of literature and drawing upon pre-
vious work of the research team [11]. The interviews were re-
corded using an audio recorder, transcribed verbatim, and 
anonymized.
Data Analysis
The data were analyzed using classic grounded theory approach 
[26], using mainly inductive methods of inquiry. Grounded 
theory relies on simultaneous data collection and analysis, in an 
iterative manner that enables theory construction and does not 
rely on existing frameworks for analysis. The analysis aimed to 
explore categories and relationships within the data collected. 
During focused coding, a constant comparative method was 
used for the analysis of the emerging categories and themes 
[27], aided by Nvivo 11 software. The data from observations, 
documentary analysis, and interviews were open coded to iden-
tify key categories, which were developed into themes. The 
analysis was conducted using an iterative and recursive process 
of moving between the coded data, data collection in the field, 
and the higher-level themes, until the themes and the relation-
ship between the themes reached saturation (ie, no new themes 
or interrelationships between them were identified).
RESULTS
The results presented below are derived from the analysis of 
field notes, documents, and the interview data. The field notes 
and quotes in this article are representative of the key emerging 
themes. Between August 2015 and May 2017, 30 surgical and 
22 medical WRs (Figure  2) were observed. More than 100 
hours of observation of routine healthcare worker practices 
were also collected from the wards. The acute surgical team 
was comprised of 6 surgeons, and the acute medical team of 14 
consultants. Twenty-three healthcare professionals (14 in sur-
gery, 9 in medicine) including surgeons, medical consultants, 
trainee doctors, nurses, and pharmacists were interviewed 
(Supplementary Data).
Differences in Team Dynamics and Characteristics of the Teams
In surgery, individualism is clear in the influence of consultant 
surgeons on the team [7, 28]. The surgical team is vertical in 
structure, with the surgeons leading decision-making and with 
less room or opportunity for team input, particularly during 
WRs (Figure 3). In medicine, a more collectivist culture prevails, 
whereby each team member is encouraged to participate. The 
medical WR included a dedicated pharmacist (Table 1, quote 
[Q] 1). The presence of the pharmacist reinforces the necessity 
to review patient medications; the pharmacist will often ques-
tion whether the antibiotic therapy could be de-escalated from 
intravenous to oral therapy or switched to a narrower-spectrum 
agent according to the local policy (Table 1, Q1).
How time is viewed and managed is an important attribute 
of each specialty and determines the collective behavior of the 
teams. The sense of time in the medical team is less structured 
or pressurized. In contrast, the surgical team focus primarily on 
Figure 2. The data gathering and analysis process.
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the “now,” requiring the team to plan and schedule, and have a 
sense of the time taken up by the WR, and the need to end it 
and move on to other tasks (Table 1, Q2 and 3). The surgical 
team has 3 main commitments including the operating room, 
clinics, and the ward. The surgeons spend much of their time in 
the clinics or operating room (Table 1, Q2). This leads to teams 
being dispersed, and working in a disjointed manner, with little 
opportunity for forward planning (Table 1, Q4). As a result, sur-
gical teams rely much more on their mobile telephones for team 
communication, including decisions about patient care that 
occur via messaging apps such as WhatsApp (Figure  3). The 
medical teams are more likely to have face-to-face meetings, 
and it is rare for mobile phones to be used on the WR. One of 
the contributing factors to the communication challenges in the 
surgical team is the lack of multidisciplinary input into patient 
care on the WR. As in the surgical observations, information is 
diffuse among the team. However, the medical team are more 
in tune with the need to have access to multidisciplinary staff 
during the WR and the review of patients (Table 1, Q5–7). The 
physical presence of the infectious disease consultant removes a 
communication barrier, with the team often requesting and re-
ceiving ad hoc advice for individual patients (Table 1, Q6).
In surgery, the diagnosis of infection is reliant on infection 
markers, including C-reactive protein, white cell count, and 
temperature. The decision-making is focused more on preven-
tion and prophylaxis than on treatment of infections. In med-
icine, though infection markers are an important part of the 
process, the team members try to rationalize their decisions, 
making efforts to align them with local policy and readily in-
volve other healthcare professionals.
Uncertainty and a Fear of Blame
The need and expectation to intervene in surgery means that 
antibiotics are readily initiated for surgical patients. This pro-
cess is rationalized by the surgeons as being an extension of 
their roles as “interventionists” [16]. In the absence of con-
crete evidence of infection, what drives decision-making is 
not the risk of failure, but the risk of blame (Table 1, Q8 and 
Q9). A  focus on starting, but not on reviewing or stopping, 
treatment can lead to unnecessary and prolonged courses of 
antibiotics (Table  1, Q10). The awareness of the culture of 
blame and responsibility that was evident in the surgical team 
is reflected in the medical team’s perception of how antibiotic 
decision-making occurs in surgery. The impetus to “do some-
thing” is greater in surgery, as “patients are not allowed to die” 
(Table 1, Q11 and Q12).
In medicine, junior members were concerned about manag-
ing risks in the context of making decisions on behalf of senior 
leaders. The junior doctors are more likely to start and esca-
late antibiotic therapy but are reliant on consultants deciding 
whether therapy needs to be de-escalated (Table  1, Q13 and 
Q14). The reluctance of the trainee doctors to de-escalate is 
tied to this acute awareness that decisions will be viewed as ulti-
mately being made on behalf of the consultant who is respon-
sible for the care of the patient, highlighting ambiguity about 
ownership for antibiotic decision-making (Table 1, Q15).
Figure 3. The key team dynamics and characteristics of the ward rounds (derived from field notes). Abbreviations: CRP, C-reactive protein; WCC, white cell count.
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Table 1. Key Emerging Themes
Theme Quote
Ward round characteristics Q1: “The consultant asks the night team ‘what have you done?’ referring to any tests and examinations the team may have 
done overnight. He asks what the patient white cell count and C-reactive protein is. ‘What about antibiotics? What have 
you given him?’ The junior doctor answers that the emergency department [ED] team started the patient on piperacillin-
tazobactam, and together with the consultant they reason that is an appropriate choice considering the patient is admitted 
from rehab. They then look at the laboratory results. The consultant sees the patient and decides to continue the antibiotics 
and also prescribe the patient furosemide. The pharmacist checks with the consultant if they are treating the patient with 
antibiotics for hospital acquired pneumonia because he’s been admitted from rehab. The consultant confirms this to be 
correct.” —Field notes, Medicine
Q2: “If you’re a surgeon you don’t want to be on the ward, you’d rather be in clinic than on the ward. And it’s where you start 
off learning about patients really.” —Interview, Surgical Intern
Q3: “Leaving the ward the junior doctor continues: ‘What I hate about surgery is that the ward rounds are done in such a rush, 
we never get to delve into the patient history, in medicine there is more delving into the detail…. he has been in our care for 
3 days and we didn’t know he has bronchiectasis.’ The surgical ward rounds are very intervention based. They are very rapid, 
the team, especially the seniors are under pressure to do round fast to go back to theatre.” —Field notes, Surgery
Q4: “If there was a war we’d all die, if we were special ops we’d get shot, it’s just not, they’re not thinking big plan format.” 
—Interview, Surgeon B
Q5: “You said it quite rightly, it’s disseminated, it’s like a puzzle. Different people hold different aspects of it, particularly it’s 
not just the medical staff, nursing staff and therapy staff and social workers.” —Interview, Medical Intern A
Q6: “There’s microbiology ward rounds … I think the [infectious disease consultant] has revolutionized our perception of treating 
infections, so I think a liaison service of someone of his personality who is enthusiastic, engaging, kind, and considerate. 
I think that’s the real change that’s required. What we need is a cultural change, and that is done through human interactions, 
not through facts and information. So, giving people facts isn’t going to change their perception, but heightened cultural 
awareness is, and so I think we need to engage people at a human level to make that change.” —Interview, Medical Intern B
Q7: “The pharmacists here on the ward round are really important. They, because the ethos driving us is so difficult and so 
confusing that, without them, I think there’d be a lot more errors and they will always point out what antibiotic they’re on 
and that.” —Interview, Medical Intern C
Uncertainty and a fear of 
blame
Q8: “If my patient gets a wound infection, for example, my case will be discussed at a Morbidity and Mortality meeting…
it affects my data … and my outcome data will be on a website, so I’m going to practice pretty defensive medicine, 
absolutely.” —Interview, Surgeon F
Q9: “It’s the culture, it’s easy, it’s too easy to say put them on Tazocin because I don’t want my operation screwed up.” 
—Interview, Surgeon B
Q10: “The intern goes to speak to the surgeon leading the ward round. I ask the junior doctor about the antibiotics that have been 
prescribed for the patients on the ward round. Specifically, about the piperacillin-tazobactam prescribed for the 2 patients. 
The junior doctor replies: ‘It is the surgeon’s choice for the patients… sometimes we treat with antibiotics when we can’t find 
evidence for infection. We are not as strict as pharmacy when it comes to antibiotics … we have to keep patients safe. There 
have been examples in the past when patient was not given antibiotics and developed an infection.” —Field notes, Surgery
Q11: We operate in gray areas, it’s rare that there’s 100% specific certainty. [In surgery] you’re either cutting someone open 
or you’re not, you’re either removing something or you’re not and I think when you add in medical decision-making in to 
surgery, that doesn’t really work, I think they have to know and so if you’re thinking, there might be an infection and you’ve 
already made a decision to literally cut someone open, uncertainty, they just don’t like that, and fair enough I think you’ve got 
to be really confident to cut a human being in bits, I think that’s not something I would fancy doing and I think it just is going 
to be a different mindset. It’s a different situation obviously as well, there’s the consequences I guess of getting it wrong are 
perhaps different as well both in terms of real outcomes but also maybe psychological that if you’ve cut someone open and 
then they get a horrible infection and they die, you look like an idiot. Whereas if one of my patients gets a horrible infection 
and dies, it’s not really my fault, whether it was avoidable or not, it just doesn’t feel like that.” —Interview, Consultant E
Q12: “The major challenge is this, is that, there is a fundamental difference in medicine and surgery, which is if someone comes in 
with a pneumonia, so you try and treat it, but that person with pneumonia dies. Well you tried and that’s OK. If someone comes 
in to hospital for an elective operation, and they die from sepsis or infection, that death was preventable and it’s your fault. And 
therefore, surgeons practice an incredibly defensive brand of medicine, and if there is even a small chance that me giving a dose 
of prophylactic antibiotics or keeping my patients on 10 days instead of 7, and it means that my patient’s outcome will be better, 
and my outcome data will be better, because I get judged, then I’m going to give that patient antibiotics. I’m going to do it, and 
so I think what you see is a lot of surgeons prescribe defensively, and they don’t really care what the evidence is, and they don’t 
really care what the problems [of] antibiotic resistance are. So I think that’s the major hurdle you’ve got to get over. And that’s a 
real challenge, because it’s not just providing an evidence base, you’re changing the entire culture.” —Interview, Surgeon F
Q13: “There’s a lot of gray areas and if, in medicine, you didn’t take any risks, or any perceived risks, so things that seem like 
real risks to someone who’s inexperienced, someone who’s being doing the job for 20 years sees those risks as different 
and says, I’ve seen this 100 times …. if we stop the antibiotics here and see what happens for the next 24 hours, 48 hours 
… this might not be an infection…. I think there’s the part that’s there to make sure I haven’t missed anything serious, and 
there’s the part that’s there to actually de-escalate everything and go, well actually I think that we’re overdoing it now. And 
if we take a step back here there’ll be no harm done. Because it’s taking a risk on behalf of my consultant. When I’m a 
consultant, which I will be in a few months, it’s a slightly different game … it’s up to me and where my own risk compass 
lies in my barometer of these decisions. But it’s hard to second guess someone else and what they’d like.” —Interview, 
Medical Intern C
Q14: “I think escalation is clearer, like I said, the consultant’s got 2 roles. One is to see what I’ve missed, the other is to 
de-escalate everyone being overzealous. And so the de-escalation’s something that’s definitely, I think, in the more senior 
camp. Whereas the escalation, I think the junior doctors are more likely to escalate than de-escalate. And I think that goes 
with the whole risk profile and nervousness.” —Interview, Medical Intern C
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Legacy of Infection Diagnosis in the Emergency Department Determines 
Antibiotic Decision-making in Medicine
In medicine, the critical decisions about whether a patient 
needs to be prescribed antibiotics occur in the first 24 hours of 
admission. There are multiple teams involved in the care of the 
patient, presenting challenges for assuming ownership of anti-
biotic decision-making. The participants identified problems 
arising from pressure to act and respond rapidly in the emer-
gency department (ED) (Table 1, Q16 and Q17). Some of this 
urgency to initiate antibiotics revolves around the ED clinicians 
having a heightened awareness of the need to rapidly diagnose 
and treat sepsis (Table 1, Q18). The decision-making often takes 
place without samples taken for microbiological investigations 
Theme Quote
Q15: “I think it is the same with the junior doctors as well that they are more scared of not giving them because of the risk 
of what could happen vs the risk of giving them because, I think it’s to do with risk because it’s more risky not to give it.” 
—Interview, Pharmacist A, Medicine
Legacy of infection diagnosis 
in ED determines antibiotic 
decision-making in medicine
Q16: “I do sometimes feel that people are inappropriately started on antibiotics and you think what, what’s the likely gain 
here? But it’s very difficult to do nothing, well it’s not very difficult, but you, you feel that you’re going to be criticized if you 
don’t do anything.” —Interview, Consultant C
Q17: “You can be a little tied up, because as I say if somebody’s been on a certain treatment for a few days and they’re 
getting better, you slightly worry that if you downgrade or change then you may end up halting the improvement, if you go 
I don’t think I would have given this person Tazocin, but they’ve had it for 3 days and they’ve gone from being moribund to 
sitting up chatting away, well it’s quite difficult to then go well actually I would have given them 3 days of trimethoprim and 
that would have been it.” —Interview, Consultant E
Q18: “The junior doctor replies that no blood cultures had been sent. The consultant replies that ‘For all the people with 
sepsis we’ve got to make people realize they have to take blood culture before starting antibiotics.’ The intern comments 
on the difficulty of getting the diagnosis of sepsis right: ‘Anyone with a temperature is defined as having sepsis.’ Intern 2: ‘I 
have given up with ED trying to define what sepsis is with them, now I just roll over.” —Field notes, Medicine
Q19: “We’re often making decisions so early, that you don’t even notice whether they’re [results] back or not, it doesn’t 
matter, you know you’re not going to have any relevant information so you just get on and make a decision anyway, and it’s 
only when you bother to check back, but we’re so focused on the start of the admission, the front door and all that kind of 
thing, we’re getting a culture result 4 days later, if it pops up something interesting that’s great…and then you go, did we 
even send a culture, no, oh well bit late now…. But you don’t even know what’s gone. The only time you can guarantee 
getting an MSU [midstream urine] is if you’ve asked for urinary electrolytes and you can absolutely guarantee that the 
electrolytes weren’t sent, but MSU were sent….” —Interview, Consultant E
Q20: “It certainly is a different approach than with other medications. The main difference being that you’re picking the 
antibiotic in a time when you probably don’t know the diagnosis for sure. And it’s easy enough if you’ve got an x-ray that 
shows pneumonia. But quite often … it is a bit less of a definite diagnosis.” —Interview, Medical Intern C
Q21: “So I think there’s 2 big things and both are areas of uncertainty. The first one is, is this an infection at all? Because 
obviously there’s people who come in with clear criteria for sepsis and a focus and you say this is a sepsis syndrome and 
we know there’s a valid response, we know there’s a focus, we’ve got a rough idea what it’s likely to be, and we’ve got 
a protocol for treating and that’s fine ... [second uncertainty] is a lot of the time it’s not as clear cut as that, people come 
in nonspecifically unwell, and older people they may not develop a full obvious systemic inflammatory response, they 
might have a slightly raised inflammatory markers, they might have a bit of a temperature but it’s not anything specific and 
there’s no … symptoms, so first of all is there infection at all? And then secondly if there is, where is it likely to be? And 
that determines whether we give antibiotics at all or we watch and wait, because if we are giving antibiotics, which ones 
we should use based on what we think the likelihood of the underlying focus is. But, I think the first one is probably the 
more difficult one because the acute medical model, the focus on your first day in hospital, your first few hours in hospital 
is very much on somehow, despite all this uncertainty, we can make a decision immediately and set the course of your 
treatment.” —Interview, Consultant E
Q22: “I think there’s probably far too much acceptance that once somebody’s made that decision, and it’s not always a 
consultant who’s made that decision, that actually everyone might as well carry on. I think it’s partly the training here. 
I think it’s that, if somebody makes it through ED, makes into medical admission, it’s quite hard to do nothing. It’s hard to 
justify admitting them if you’re not doing very much. And I think in a younger person that is even more difficult.” –Interview, 
Consultant A
Q23: “I think there are improvements to be made in ED with what they start on, I’m always amazed at how much 
co-amoxiclav I see prescribed by ED. I have sympathies, they’re under pressure, they do more empirical treatment than we 
do. We’re seeing someone that maybe a few more hours down the line where they’re a bit more stable and there might 
be a clearer picture of where infection lies. Even so, co-amoxiclav is not in any guidance in the sense as far as I’m aware. 
But it still gets dished out … and it generally gets dished out in ED. I think almost as often as not, maybe 50% of the time 
it gets continued because it’s been started. So, I think there’s improvements to be made at where antibiotics is started.” 
—Interview, Pharmacist A
Q24: “I think it’s more fear than trust. I think the person who gets to know the patient best is the, is probably the junior 
doctor who clerks in a patient. And everyone from that person onwards is making an impression based upon information 
that they have to trust from someone else. So, I can see how there’s reluctance to change something that someone else 
has started, who you probably think knows the patient, and has got to grips with the situation better than you have. Plus, 
the longer that goes on, a day, 2 days, 3 days, you’re like, well, it’s not the best antibiotic but they’ve already had 2 days’ 
worth of it, you’ll continue that for the 5-day course.. I think that where to intervene is at the beginning and as early on as 
possible before things get down the line.” —Interview, Medical Intern C
Table 1. Continued
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(Table 1, Q19 and Q20). There is also a perception that often 
antibiotics are initiated upon admission to buy time for the clini-
cians and to act as an exercise in uncertainty avoidance (Table 1, 
Q21). This decision to initiate therapy where there is a suspicion 
of infection becomes difficult to evaluate and review on sub-
sequent WRs, particularly if patient symptoms are improving. 
There is a reluctance to change or override the decisions made 
in ED (Table 1, Q22–Q24). This reluctance to assume responsi-
bility for the antibiotic decision-making made in the ED is not 
replicated for other classes of medication. Anticoagulants, anal-
gesics, and blood pressure medications are amended during the 
WR and adjusted based on the patient symptoms. Cardiology 
issues are routinely apportioned to the cardiologist intern based 
on the admissions ward (field notes). It is only for the antibiotic 
therapy that the teams report and exhibit a hesitation to alter 
the prescribing decisions of their colleagues (Table 1, Q17).
DISCUSSION
The patient care pathway in hospitals includes a multitude of 
medical and surgical specialties, pharmacists, nurses, and allied 
healthcare professionals, who may prioritize different policies, 
agendas, and interim goals. Different specialties have their own 
language, behaviors, social norms, and values. The cultural dif-
ferences between specialties and healthcare professionals: (1) 
shape the shared knowledge within and across specialities in 
patient pathways, and (2) result in variation in care, thus impact-
ing patient outcomes. Antibiotic decision-making is driven by 
different determinants in medicine vs surgery. There are differ-
ent drivers of overuse that arise from cultural and contextual 
differences across these specialties. An understanding of these 
key differences is essential to the development of contextually 
fit and sustainable interventions to optimize antibiotic use.
The interplay of collectivist vs individualistic approaches, 
together with fear of negative outcomes in surgery, leads to less 
tolerance to uncertainty. In medicine, uncertainty arises from 
the transition of care between ED and inpatient teams. The med-
ical teams take a more collectivist approach than surgical teams. 
Though subject to communication flaws, the medical team 
addresses them by including other healthcare professionals, such 
as the pharmacist and infectious diseases consultant, in routine, 
daily decision-making. The presence of the pharmacist on the 
WR and the infectious diseases consultant on the ward means 
that they can have direct discussions with the consultants and 
decisions can be made there and then. The cultural norm of col-
lectivism and the interdisciplinary approach to decision-making 
contribute to efforts to optimize antibiotic use. The gaps in care 
around antibiotic decision-making in medicine appear to be in 
the 24 hours after admission, when the patient moves from ED 
to medical wards. This transition of care between different teams 
is a challenge to antibiotic optimization. The Surviving Sepsis 
Campaigns have driven the culture of being “infection aware” 
and initiating antibiotics for patients upon admission [29], but 
can have the unintended consequence of driving inappropriate 
antibiotic use in the ED. The medical team in this study reported 
frustrations at antibiotics being initiated in the ED that are then 
not reviewed or de-escalated. Though it can be accepted that 
patients may be started on empirical antibiotics with little evi-
dence of infection in the first hours of admission, it is not accept-
able for patients to remain on antibiotics unnecessarily once the 
medical teams have had time to clinically review and reassess 
patients. The pharmacists have in this study been identified as 
healthcare professionals who can oversee and promote rational-
ized antibiotic decision-making, if they are part of the WR. If sup-
ported by the wider team, they may be able to address the gaps in 
ownership in antibiotic prescribing in the transition between the 
ED and inpatient teams for medical patients. The transition from 
the ED to surgical inpatients was less problematic as the surgical 
team assumed responsibility for patients identified as needing 
surgical attention in the ED. There is no transition of patients 
between teams, and the surgical team remains in charge of the 
patient for the duration of the admission episode.
The surgical team however, has its own unique challenges. 
Having the senior surgeons in theater and the junior doctors 
chasing medical jobs means that the skill mix of the team on 
the ward is sometimes imbalanced. Difficult decisions such 
as de-escalation of antibiotic therapy are often deferred. This 
may result in prolonged and unnecessary courses of antibiot-
ics for surgical patients. The surgeons prioritize surgical and 
patient outcomes, and their fear of negative patient outcomes 
overrides the fear of the unintended consequences of inappro-
priate antibiotic use. Time is limited in the surgical team due 
to the demands from the clinics, operating room, and wards. 
The different professions do get involved in the surgical patient 
pathway, but they tend to work in silos, with few communica-
tion opportunities between them. Multidisciplinary teamwork 
is not easily practiced in such a context, and time constraints are 
part of the problem. The surgeons’ time on the ward is extremely 
limited, so they must prioritize their commitments, preferring 
to only communicate with their own team and expecting the 
junior members of the team to coordinate the multidisciplinary 
tasks and actions that are identified. Therefore, it may not be 
expedient to suggest replicating the acute medical model of in-
cluding a pharmacist on surgical WRs. Equally it may be unre-
alistic to expect surgeons to include ASPs in their daily review 
of patients. We identified inconsistencies in the approach to 
antibiotic decision-making in surgery, often with the key iden-
tified variables not discussed as part of the WR. Some of this is 
due to the practicalities of the WRs in surgery and can be over-
come through simple solutions (Table 2). The surgeons, though 
not fully engaged with the antibiotic decisions made for their 
patients, remain the leaders in their specialty and engaging with 
them in ASP will be tantamount to engaging with their entire 
team. They have the power to influence the behaviors of their 
entire team. When constructing ASPs targeting surgical teams, 
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the language and metrics must reflect the priorities of surgical 
teams, who are focused on outcomes. Using length of hospital 
stay and surgical outcomes may be more convincing measures 
than antibiotic consumption rates. It is also important to recog-
nize the different work patterns and shifts of surgeons, and to 
accommodate these differences in the effort to include them in 
ASPs. For example, the surgical handover is an opportunity for 
engaging with the surgical team. The first 30 minutes to 1 hour 
is dedicated to detailed discussion of patients, including those 
admitted via the ED. Pharmacist and/or infectious diseases 
specialists can participate in the handover to discuss antibiotic- 
and infection-related issues for the patients. The surgical team 
uses messaging groups and texting as a preferred means of com-
munication. Developing a specialty-level ASP-specific group on 
a messaging platform may get the attention of the team more 
effectively than the pharmacist trying to page the junior team, 
who must ratify any decisions verbally or via messages with the 
senior team. Becoming more engaged and involved with the 
surgical teams in the management and prevention of infection 
will also provide opportunities for the ASP teams to understand 
the priorities and difficulties in the surgical pathway. This will 
help them develop more context-driven interventions that are 
more likely to be adopted by the surgeons. Furthermore, it may 
result in a more interdisciplinary ASP in surgery.
This is a single-center study limited to acute medical and sur-
gical teams in one hospital in England. While the findings may 
be broadly applicable to other settings, we are replicating the 
study in centers in India and South Africa investigating anti-
biotic decision-making across surgical pathways. The study 
methodology has also been replicated in a study in Australia.
CONCLUSIONS
The observed variation in the social norms, values, and behav-
iors in medicine and surgery defines the approach to anti-
biotic decision-making. The medical team adopts a more 
policy-driven, interdisciplinary approach that includes phar-
macist and infectious diseases input. The transition of care 
between the ED and inpatient care is a critical point for opti-
mizing antibiotic prescription decisions in medicine. The 
surgical teams perceive themselves to be highly skilled inter-
ventionists, and see ASPs as having a low priority. Medical and 
surgical specialties represent different tribes, with different 
cultures and challenges. To optimize antibiotic use across these 
specialties, it is imperative that interventions are designed with 
these unique challenges in mind.
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